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Bringing (domestic) politics back in:  
Global and local influences on health equity  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Lancet-University of Oslo Commission on Global Governance for health correctly 
concluded that: ‘With globalisation, health inequity increasingly results from transnational 
activities that involve actors with different interests and degrees of power’. At the same time, 
taking up that Commission’s focus on political determinants of health and ‘power 
asymmetries’ requires recognizing the interplay of globalization with domestic politics, and 
the limits of global influences as explanations for policies that affect health inequalities. I 
make this case using three examples – trade policy, climate change policy, and the domestic 
politics of poverty reduction and social policy – and a concluding observation about the 2015 
UK election.  
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Introduction 
The conference where the original version of this analysis was presented took place against 
the backdrop of the Ebola outbreak in sub-Saharan Africa. The outbreak dramatized the 
weaknesses of the region’s national health systems, and threatened to exacerbate those 
weaknesses as ‘secondary health crises’ emerge in such areas as malaria, nutrition and 
maternal care.
1
 The weaknesses reflect international influences. Rowden has argued that ‘the 
conspicuous unpreparedness of countries like Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone is a direct 
consequence of years of insufficient public investment in the underlying public health 
infrastructure’ – and, further, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s obsession with 
fiscal restraint is partly to blame.
1
 Other authors have similarly pointed to the connections 
between the region’s extreme poverty and its integration into the global economy on highly 
exploitative terms, through such processes as land grabbing by foreign actors.
2
  
This example shows the importance of one of the conclusions reached by the Lancet-
University of Oslo Commission on Global Governance for Health: ‘With globalisation, health 
inequity increasingly results from transnational activities that involve actors with different 
interests and degrees of power’.3 (p. 630) The Commission also foregrounded the concepts of 
‘‘power asymmetries’ and ‘political determinants of health’, which introduce a further level 
of complexity to the analysis. While the Commission was primarily concerned with power 
asymmetries on a global scale, in fact they operate on multiple scales, often involving the 
effects of globalization and global (or at least transnational) economic and political actors on 
domestic economic opportunity structures, resource distributions, and politics. Further, there 
are situations in which domestic political choices are crucial enablers, facilitators or 
promoters of globalization. In still other cases, globalization plays only a minor role in 
shaping political preferences and policy choices that affect health and health inequalities. An 
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adequate understanding of the political determinants of health must include and recognize all 
these possibilities, paying special attention to interactions between the global and the 
domestic or the local.  Here I present three examples – all that space constraints permit, but 
enough to demonstrate the importance of such interactions for understanding the politics of 
health and to suggest the value of a larger research program, as part of what has been called  a 
‘political science of health’.4   
Example 1: Trade policy  
In a world where production is routinely organized across multiple national borders in 
complex commodity and value chains, trade policy is not only about tariffs and non-tariff 
limitations on trade, but also about investment and various ‘behind-the-border’ policies 
including standards related to public health. A key characteristic of the post-1995 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) regime, and an accompanying proliferation of bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements some of which actually predate the WTO, is that they restrict 
governments’ policy space: ‘the freedom, scope, and mechanisms that governments have to 
choose, design, and implement public policies to fulfill their aims’.5 (p. 105)  Notably, 
harmonization of intellectual property protection under provisions of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), which were driven by the economic 
interests of US pharmaceutical and information technology corporations,
6
 has restricted 
governments’ ability to provide access to essential medicines. This impact has been 
magnified by so-called TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
3 (p. 
642);7
 More recently, intellectual property protection under trade agreements has been invoked 
by the tobacco industry as a basis for opposing plain packaging requirements.
3 (p. 643-4)
   
 Other health impacts are less conspicuous. For example, an expanding body of 
research indicates that trade and investment liberalization have facilitated the unhealthy 
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transformation of diets in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) by fast food chains, 
supermarkets, and producers of ultra-processed foods.
8-10
 Mexico, where such trends are 
especially conspicuous, now has obesity rates comparable to those in the United States. When 
countries lower trade barriers and make labour markets more ‘flexible’ in order to attract 
foreign investment, the result is often destruction of livelihoods by imports that may be 
heavily subsidized.
11
 The health consequences that result
12
 are much more difficult to 
document to an epidemiological standard of proof, at least until long after the window of 
opportunity for policies to protect employment and health has closed.  
 In some cases, trade and investment liberalization has been a response to IMF and 
World Bank conditionalities, a key aim of which was to restructure national economies 
around competitive export sectors in order to protect countries’ ability to repay foreign debts. 
Even when such conditionalities are not an issue, large economies (like the United States) or 
economic blocs (like the European Union) have a formidable bargaining advantage in 
bilateral or plurilateral negotiations with smaller economies, meaning they are able to 
demand major concessions (in areas like intellectual property protection, which can drive up 
the costs of medicines) in exchange for limited increases in access to their markets.
13
 The 
negotiation of trade and investment agreements thus exemplifies global power asymmetries. 
However, such asymmetries exist within countries as well as among them. When 
governments enter into trade and investment agreements or make other kinds of commitments 
involving the global marketplace, they may be accepting risks on behalf of vulnerable groups 
with limited political voice, in the interests of securing gains to domestic constituencies such 
as export industries or property investors. This helps to explain why governments accept 
provisions that may expand market access for attract foreign investment even as they limit 
access to essential medicines by raising their cost, or create new constraints on policy space 
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through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms that are beyond effective 
democratic control.
14-15
  
In such cases, the role of external influences on trade policy is limited; they may 
function primarily as a way of adding credibility to domestic elite agendas. Policy elites led 
Mexico unilaterally to liberalize trade and expose domestic producers to foreign competition 
well before it agreed to do so within the North American market under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
16
; it has been argued that NAFTA itself was adopted in 
order to lock in neoliberal domestic economic policies by restricting future governments’ 
policy space,
17
 for example through its ISDS provisions. Thus, although global inequalities 
clearly play a role in explaining the health consequences of the contemporary trade policy 
regime, at least some trade policy commitments confirm Halperin’s view that: ‘Globalization 
is a matter of deliberate organization and collective effort on the part of elites concerned to 
maintain a specific distribution of resources that subordinates labour and preserves elite 
privileges. The discourse of globalization emphasizes the necessity of governments to adapt 
to newness and difference, a necessity that forecloses choice. But government policies are 
designed, not to adapt to new circumstances, but to promote them’.18 (p. 224)    
Example 2: Climate change 
Climate change was identified by a 2009 Lancet Commission as ‘the biggest global health 
threat of the 21
st
 century’.19 The week before the argument made in this article was first 
presented, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its latest 
synthesis report, with such findings as: ‘In urban areas, climate change is projected to 
increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, 
storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, 
drought, water scarcity, sea-level rise, and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks 
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are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed 
areas’.20 (p. SPM-11)  Two direct parallels with the financial crisis that swept across the world in 
2008 and led to the Great Recession are worth noting. First, well before the financial crisis, 
financial stability was recognized as a true global public good
21
 (one of a few). Climate 
stability likewise represents a true global public good, and like public goods in general it will 
be (and is) radically undersupplied by markets. Appropriate institutions for collective 
response are needed to ensure adequate provision of public goods and in this case, as with 
financial stability, they must operate at the supranational level. Second, as with the financial 
crisis, the adverse impacts of climate change on livelihoods and health will be felt first, and 
worst, by those who made almost no contribution to the crisis (in the form of greenhouse gas 
emissions) and have no control over its progression. This is yet another illustration of the 
consequences of power asymmetries on a global scale.    
Held and colleagues have pointed out one set of obstacles to progress: the size and 
wealth of the affected industries.
22 (p. 265)
 Stabilizing the world’s climate will require 
confronting an oil and gas industry that includes six of the top 10 companies on the Financial 
Times Global 500 list for 2014 (eight of the top 13) by revenue, three of the top 10 by 
profitability, and three of the top 12 by market capitalization.
23
 Oil and gas is not the only 
industry whose growth and profits will be affected by serious initiatives to stabilize global 
warming, and the oil and gas industry’s fortunes have important consequences for national 
and sub-national governments, like Canada’s and those of three of its provinces, with revenue 
streams that rely heavily on fossil fuel royalties and corporate incomes.  
Another set of obstacles, rooted in domestic politics and policy preferences, is also 
relevant. Immediately outside the building where I work, as in much of the high-income 
world outside major urban centres, is a car park (Figure 1). Twenty minutes’ walk away is a 
local landmark shopping park, which advertises more than 2000 free parking spaces. The 
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convenience and comfort of driving are taken for granted as a reasonable expectation if not 
an entitlement. If Margaret Thatcher did not actually say that ‘a man who, beyond the age of 
26, finds himself on a bus can count himself as a failure’, everyday conversations suggest that 
many people hold this belief. One can argue that proliferations of car parks are partly a 
response to under-investment in public transport, which is true, but the observation only 
underscores the importance of choices about policy priorities. Figures from the Royal 
Automobile Club Foundation show that between 2004 and 2014, the cost of travelling by 
coach or rail rose twice as fast as the cost of driving
24
; late in 2014 the UK government, with 
support from across the partisan spectrum, announced a £15 billion program of road 
construction.
25-26
 Apart from the car park and road building cultures, most OECD countries 
subsidize company cars, albeit to widely different degrees, with Germany – widely viewed as 
a leader in integrating environmental concerns into public policy – underwriting the average 
company car to the tune of almost 2,500 Euros per year. Italy, in the midst of financial crisis, 
still spends almost as much.
27
 Spending like the UK’s on roads and Italy’s on company cars 
underscores the highly selective nature of austerity; it seldom touches the prerogatives of the 
privileged.    
Outside the high-income world,  it is reasonable to assume that a few hundred million 
members of the expanding middle class would like to be able to treat automobiles as an 
entitlement in the same way that we do – even though they may not, as Friedman famously 
commented in an exchange with Ramonet, want to drive them to Disney World.
28
 If the high-
income world cannot kick the car park and company car habit, with its inequitable 
consequences,
29
 it seems unreasonable to ask that people in considerably poorer parts of the 
world get out of the car and onto the train, or the cycle, or the pavement. Meanwhile, many 
such jurisdictions are already making policy choices that favour drivers who are for the 
moment in a minority.
30-33
 This reflects the same kind of power asymmetry within their 
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boundaries that sustains subsidies for company cars in the high-income world, and shrinks the 
constituency for alternative strategies while literally casting future land use and settlement 
patterns in concrete.    
Example 3: New economic cartographies 
The importance of the politics of distribution and poverty reduction within national borders is 
suggested by the fact that roughly 70 percent of the world’s poorest people – defined by the 
World Bank threshold of living on US $1.25 or less per day – no longer live in the world’s 
poorest countries.
34
 Several large countries - Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Indonesia - have 
moved out of the low-income grouping, again as defined by the World Bank, but substantial 
portions of their populations remain in extreme poverty.
34
 This change has led Sumner to 
argue that: ‘[I]n the not-too-distant future, most of the world’s poor will live in countries that 
do have the domestic financial scope to end at least extreme poverty … This will likely pave 
the way for addressing poverty reduction as primarily a domestic issue rather than primarily 
an aid and international issue; and thus a (re)framing of poverty as a matter of national 
distribution and national social contracts and political settlements between elites, middle 
classes and the poor’.34 (p. 3)  
At least two problems with this formulation can be identified.    
First, although Sumner may be correct about the declining relevance of aid for many 
countries, poverty reduction must remain an international issue with respect to such matters 
as controlling capital flight and corporate tax evasion. For example, capital flight has been a 
major impediment to African development, and thereby to the availability of resources of 
health care and poverty reduction, as African elites have shifted their assets into regions 
where risks are lower and returns higher.
35
 Ndikumana and colleagues
36
 estimate the value of 
capital flight from 39 African countries between 1970 and 2010 as US $1.3 trillion (at 2010 
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currency values), or $1.68 trillion if modest interest earnings are imputed. This is more than 
five times the value of the external debts of the countries in question, and more than the 
combined value of development assistance and foreign direct investment over the same 
period. Like the tango, capital flight requires two willing participants, and capital flight of 
this magnitude could not exist without welcomes from private banks and tax havens in rich 
countries.
37
  
Second, it is unwise to presume that the settlements Sumner anticipates will 
necessarily be favourable for reducing poverty or health inequity. Replication of something 
like the postwar political settlement between labour and capital in the high-income countries, 
in which governments of various political stripes agreed on collective bargaining rights, 
nearly full employment as a policy objective, and a more-than-minimal welfare state, cannot 
be relied upon. That settlement is under heightened threat from a combination of accumulated 
sovereign debt and recession.
38
 Although reports of the settlement’s death are premature, it 
looks increasingly like an historical anomaly, and governments have largely repudiated it in 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that have travelled farthest down the 
neoliberal road.  
Outside the high-income world it is useful to consider Brazil, where successive 
Workers’ Party governments have made major advances in reducing economic inequality39 
(from extremely high levels, and with the advantage of robust economic growth due to high 
commodity prices until circa 2012), expanding access to primary health care,
40
 and reducing 
poverty through the Bolsa Família cash transfer program. At the same time, public 
investments ‘brought large numbers of new government contracts to a familiar assortment of 
Brazil’s large private companies’, involving resources that ‘dwarfed those spent on the Bolsa 
Família’,41 and forced resettlements of the poor were carried out in order to acquire valuable 
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sites for the Pan American Games and the Olympics – key elements in branding Brazil as a 
‘world class’ destination for investment and tourism.42    
The Brazilian case may be broadly reflective of the power asymmetries and class 
compromises that can be expected at the benign end of the policy spectrum; even in contexts 
where social protections are expanded, far more resources may be mobilized for programs 
that serve the interests and priorities of the wealthy and powerful. And for every Brazil there 
is likely to be a Nigeria, where oil wealth is massively concentrated against a background of 
widespread extreme poverty,
43
 or an India, where 182,000 millionaires and a top economic 
decile whose share of the country’s product is rising44 coexist with more than 400 million 
people living below the World Bank extreme poverty threshold, and 50 percent of the 
population had no alternative to outdoor defecation circa 2011.
45
 In December 2014, a newly 
elected Indian government announced a 20 percent cut in its health budget,
46
 despite national 
performance on basic indicators like immunization and child nutrition that lags well behind 
even poorer countries.
45
  
Discusssion 
In a world where production can easily be offshored and the global financial marketplace 
multiplies portfolio choices, distributional conflicts are no longer contained within national 
borders as they were during the era that gave rise to the postwar settlement. Globalization has 
magnified inequalities in resources among actors (like transnational corporations and trade 
unions) and classes within those borders. At the same time, too much can be made of the 
constraints associated with globalization – as evidenced, for example, by the threefold 
variation in the prevalence of poverty after taxes and transfers in the high-income world.
47
 
High-income countries may be less constrained than others by a range of global power 
asymmetries, as Mosley
48
 has shown to be the case for financial markets. Nevertheless, it is 
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difficult to see how globalization can explain policy choices like India’s, or like the failure 
over a decade of most African Union countries to live up to their 2001 commitment (in the 
Abuja declaration) to increasing public spending on health to 15 percent of their general 
government budgets.
49
  Much of the increase in inequality of market incomes in countries 
across the income spectrum may be attributable to globalization, but if globalization can 
explain (re)distributive policy choices it is at least partly by way of how global institutions 
and flows influence political allegiances and resources as they alter economic opportunity 
structures within a country’s borders and change the resources available to domestic actors.   
The importance of this distinction is more than academic. Before the financial crisis, 
health inequalities between rich and poor districts in Britain were larger on some measures 
than at any point since the Great Depression.
50
 The UK election of 2015 saw the return to 
power with a Parliamentary majority of a Conservative government that had responded to the 
exigencies of the crisis with a (selective) austerity program that was on track to shrink public 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP to levels not seen since before the second World War,
51
 
while overall redistributing income upward.
52
 The election outcome arguably substantiates 
Mackenbach’s assertion  that ‘reducing health inequalities is currently beyond our means’ in 
England, because the electorate would probably not support the ‘massive re-allocation of 
societal resources’ that would be necessary to counteract market influences that increase 
inequality.
53 (p. 1252)
  That lack of support, however, demands explanation rather than 
providing it, and global influences can plausibly supply only part of the explanation. The 
political science of health must consider the interplay between globalization and domestic 
politics, keeping in mind Halperin’s observations about elite motivations and strategies, and 
develop more sophisticated analyses of the political conditions and coalitions that may make 
it possible to reduce health inequalities in a challenging environment.   
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Figure 1. University car park, United Kingdom [details to follow post-review] 
 
Photo: Author. 
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